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Section I : An Introduction to Unmanned Systems
As unmanned systems become increasingly prevalent in global militaries, it has become
crucial to gain a deeper understanding of the societal implications of the rapid technological
advancements in this area, including their ethical implications and effects on public policy. This
paper will analyze the technological development and ethical considerations of fully autonomous
weapon systems used within the US military and around the world to propose policy
development to ensure a conscientious future of warfare.
Unmanned Systems (UMS) are broadly categorized as electro-mechanical systems able to
perform designed missions without human operators aboard. These systems receive a mission
from a human and accomplish that mission with varied Human Robot Interaction, depending on
its level of autonomy. Human Robot Interaction (HRI) describes the level of involvement by
humans in the engagement and control of the UMS to achieve the mission goals. There are 4
different modes of operation for an UMS: Fully Autonomous, Semi-Autonomous, Teleoperation,
and Remote Control (Huang 2004). The first mode of operation is full autonomy, which is where
the UMS is expected to accomplish its mission without human intervention. A semi-autonomous
UMS completes a mission with varying levels of HRI, but without being entirely controlled nor
entirely autonomous. Teleoperation is when the human operator uses sensory feedback to either
directly control the UMS or assign incremental goals. The final mode of operation is Remote
Control, which is where the operator directly controls the UMS on a continuous basis, which




























be applied to the UMS in the military, however the focus of this paper will be on fully
autonomous unmanned systems, specifically Automated Weapon Systems.
The Automated Weapon System (AWS) is a weapons system that once given a mission,
can select and engage targets without further intervention by a human operator. However, these
systems are designed to allow human operators to override their operation of the weapon system
when required. Although such systems have not been fully developed yet, with recent
technological advances in artificial intelligence, these systems are highly likely to become part of
the military landscape over the next few years (Congressional Research Service 2018). When
the development of these systems are complete, they will have the ability to make life and death
targeting decisions “on their own”. Shooting without control by a human operator has military
advantages like taking the place of human operators in harsh or dangerous environments.
However, these systems have limitations as well, such as the absence of human understanding
and contextualization of specific situations. These limitations suggest questions of the ethical
implications of the use of lethal autonomous systems, with the understanding that someday
machines will be the ones to make life or death decisions on the battlefield.
In making their decisions, current unmanned systems rely heavily upon the perception,
processing, and subsequent response to data from their surroundings to effectively carry out
military tasks with minimal human intervention and interaction. They have been developed for
military use and have applications in the design of submarines, drones, land vehicles, weaponry,
and aircrafts. Although recently there have been rapid advancements in the areas of unmanned






























World War II. The predecessors of this technology were remotely-piloted vehicles and drones
programmed to be guided to a specific target (Everett 2015). Since then, developments in sensor
technology, computing capabilities, and the advancement of artificial intelligence applications
have allowed this technology to evolve and change the way modern weaponry is designed and
publicly perceived. Processing data on this scale is increasingly reliant on harnessing artificial
intelligence (AI) technology, which in turn is introducing an entirely new host of ethical
considerations in and of itself. It is these technological advancements that are giving rise to novel
moral and ethical questions about the implementation of these autonomous weapon systems in
the context of modern warfare.
Autonomous weapons systems lie at the intersection of military technology and
advancements in machine learning / artificial intelligence applications. The role of machine
learning algorithms in creating robust defense systems is an idea that arises naturally when one
considers the primary capabilities of existing AI technology. The main premise of artificial
intelligence is based on algorithm-based decision making. If a computer is given enough data, it
can use mathematical models to find patterns, make predictions, and draw conclusions based on
this data. If the conclusion is correct and validated, the existing predictive model is reinforced,
and if the conclusion is incorrect, the computer takes this into account and readjusts its model to
make an improved prediction the next time (Hao 2018). Much like how a person learns by being
told when their answer is right and when it is wrong, a computer can “learn” to make better
decisions. The data used to train an AI model can be previously collected data, or real-time input





























(Verschae 2018). Based on this input data, the algorithm can be programmed to take what it
perceives to be the best course of action.
Of course, the implications of this technology are numerous in military and defense
sectors. Designing vehicles and weapons that can venture into dangerous or unknown
environments and take military action without requiring external support would protect many
soldiers and pilots from taking that risk. Such applications may include surveillance and
dispersion of supplies, but they may also include taking lethal action--particularly in the realm of
deploying autonomous weapons such as self-guided missiles.
In fact, discourse about the future of military strategies is likely to become ever more
dominated by AI-enabled warfare technology. Consideration must be given to whether militaries
can or should rely on algorithms to make military decisions for them. To what extent can the
technology be trusted, still in its early development stages? It is also important to consider
whether any novel vulnerabilities will arise as opposing forces work to dismantle one another’s
AI-enabled technology. Will harnessing this technology truly provide a military advantage and
help ensure national security? As powerful nations are racing to build the smartest weapons
possible, it is important that ethical considerations and the introduction of policy maintain pace.
The nature of military decisions must be seriously considered when determining whether
the use of artificial intelligence in these scenarios is just. Depending on how advanced the
technology may be, false positives and false negatives as outcomes are not uncommon in the





























amounts of external data being processed in real-time. In other applications of artificial
intelligence, the consequences of the computer making the wrong decision may not be
detrimental, but military decisions are a matter of life and death, and the severity of this
consequence is not one to be taken lightly.
Arguably, war is inevitable, and the goal of developing military technology should
ultimately be to make war more humane, ensuring safety and protection that minimizes civilian
casualties and collateral damage. One must consider whether the advancement of this technology
will enable our society to achieve this goal, and if so, what policy should also be implemented
for its regulation on a national and international scale.
Sophisticated technologies such as Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) will
soon become advanced military’s weapons of choice. Although they seem incredibly futuristic,
multiple militaries, such as those of the United States, China, Israel, South Korea, and Russia,
have already begun to develop and test certain LAWS (Patrick 2019). As previously stated, these
systems have minimal human guidance and are able to effectively diminish U.S. military deaths.
The United States, Russia, and China are currently the largest investors of their national
militaries and are reaching for a “revolution in warfare” (Bode 2018). These three powerful
militaries will uphold the future of LAWS during armed conflict. Questions and concerns,
however, have been raised regarding the legality, or even morality, of such systems. Laws and































The United States military is one of the few already beginning to use LAWS as a defense
mechanism (Bode 2018). The technology is advantageous as an actual human soldier does not
need to be on the battlefield to attack the opposing side. There are also numerous reports of these
systems being more accurate and precise than the average soldier. Currently, the U.S. military
has very few LAWS in action. However, the future holds potential for complete LAWS battles.
As of today, the U.S. Army has a plan set in place to further the development and use of LAWS
through phases of different technological deployments (Klare 2019). Other sectors of the
military, such as the U.S. Navy, are also developing their own autonomous technologies to find
and attack enemy vessels (Klare 2019). While these innovations are ground-breaking, there are
certain policies in place that restrict and regulate the expansion of LAWS in application.
Aside from the national ruling of LAWS, there are broader, international regulations to
be considered as well. One of the most significant concerns is whether or not technologies as
substantial as LAWS are in accordance with International Humanitarian Law (IHL). The IHL, an
international agreement made during the Geneva Conventions, is set to “limit the effects of
armed conflict” (ICRC 2018). This law was put into place as a means to alleviate human
suffering through war crimes during armed conflict. In addition to IHL, the Law of War is
founded upon five principles: military necessity, unnecessary suffering, proportionality,
distinction (discrimination), and honor (chivalry) (International 2004). These five principles
support the ideals of the IHL while opposing those of LAWS. While many believe that the moral
implications of LAWS disregard both the IHL and the Law of War, the technologies have not





























States, Russia, and China continue their development of LAWS at varying degrees of pace that
the technological advancements permit.
While the regulations regarding LAWS are in place, the most recent update to U.S. policy
was over eight years ago in 2012. The outdated ruling offers evidence that policy decisions
cannot keep up with current innovation. The growth of AI technologies has quickly become
exponential. National and international policies take years to become fully implemented. Thus,
the lack of correlation between innovation and policy is making it increasingly difficult to
regulate the utilization of LAWS.
Section II: Existing Policy Summary
Currently, the United States national policy does not prevent lethal autonomous weapons
from being developed or used, but this has become a controversial point among researchers,
policymakers, military officers, and leaders in the field. As adversaries of the United States begin
developing these weapons, it is increasingly clear that the United States will need to give due
consideration to what policy measures would best suit the needs of future national security
strategies. However, many international states and human rights groups are calling for increased
regulation about the development of these weapons--if not a complete ban on them altogether.
Ethical concerns are most oft-cited by these groups as the primary cause of opposition to these
weapons (ICRC 2018). The development of policies surrounding these weapons have numerous
implications for the future of national security in the United States. This includes allocation of






























international treaties. Such precautions would need to be instituted to ensure that other nations
would also abide by any ethics-based guidelines that the international community may agree
upon for the regulation and development of autonomous lethal weapons.
In the United States, the Department of Defense Directive (DODD) is the branch
responsible for the establishment of any policy on weapon systems. Until this point, the
definition of autonomous weapons systems has been a series of categorizations of the weapons
based on how they choose targets and the extent to which they make decisions, as well as the
role of the human operator and how much oversight or control they may have in deploying the
weapon. Currently, DODD defines lethal autonomous weapons as “weapon system[s] that, once
activated, can select and engage targets without further intervention by a human operator”
(Sayler 2019). Additionally, based on the DODD’s definition, these weapons are further
subdivided into two categories. The first category is human-supervised, where a human operator
monitors the weapon’s actions, and is able to stop it if necessary. The second category is
semi-autonomous weapons, which require a human operator to select a target before deploying
the weapon in an irreversible decision. Guided missiles would be one example of a
semi-autonomous weapon, where a target can be specified, but then autonomously travels
without human intervention (Sayler 2019).
A key factor in existing policy that will likely be taken into consideration for any policy
revisions in the future, is the key role of a human operator when deploying these systems.
Currently, DODD has a requirement that all systems, not only lethal autonomous systems, “allow






























(Sayler 2019). The critical element here is that a human being should be the one to make the
decision about whether force should be used, and if so, to what extent to make it appropriate for
the context. But the current development of technology for this class of weapons is headed in a
direction where a human being would not be the one to make this decision--an algorithm would
be. One may argue that an algorithm is designed by a human with particular decision constraints
in mind, so the machine is being trained to make decisions just as a human would. But this is one
of the many contentious points that is being debated by policymakers, researchers, and human
rights groups. Even in the current policy, human judgement of force is not interpreted to mean
that a human has to control the weapon manually throughout the process. It simply means that a
human needs to be making decisions about the deployment of the weapon in the capacities of
why it is being used, when it should be used, in what context, against whom, and how it should
be deployed. This does not specify or account for what additional decisions about force the
weapon itself may have to make once having been deployed, including whether the weapon will
use the level of force originally intended by the human deploying it.
Human beings can be taught and trained to abide by ethical guidelines, to follow the laws
of war, be conscious of the complexities of international relations and treaties, and what level of
engagement with an adversary may be appropriate for one context versus another. What perhaps
many people wanting more cautious regulations about lethal autonomous weapons are wary of is
a weapon’s inability to do the same. Current policy requires that anyone handling an autonomous
weapon in the military be sufficiently trained, periodically evaluated, and have a full





























also expected to have a human-machine user interface that is developed so that people are able to
control it when it is used and make informed decisions.
As for the development of the weapon itself, DODD policy states that the hardware and
software of the system must be subject to extensive testing (Sayler 2019). If it is not able to
complete a mission for some reason, there has to be a backup plan so that a human is able to
make decisions to control it or choose to terminate the mission. Precautionary measures must
also be taken to ensure that the system is reevaluated every time any software is changed (Sayler
2019). However, this may prove to be a challenge as machine learning by its nature is
continually adaptive, so developers of the weapon must be vigilant to test even more frequently.
The last national level policy currently in place regarding these weapons is the
senior-level review. Not all weapons require this secondary level review process, but essentially
a board consisting of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, and the Under Secretary of Defense
Policy verify the system is operating accordingly with all of the other policies stated above. This
is a requirement that must be met before the weapon can be deployed. The caveat is that this
process may be ceded as a requirement in the event of an emergency if the Deputy Secretary of
Defense deems it so. As of December 2019, no weapon system has been subject to this
senior-level review in the United States (Sayler 2019).
In the context of international policy, there have been numerous attempts by the United





























aspects of this issue. To date, 25 countries and 100 nongovernmental groups have been calling
for a ban on the development of these weapons altogether, due to ethical concerns of
accountability and other concrete risks associated with the development and use of such weapon
systems (Sayler 2019). And naturally, another primary concern is about the compliance of these
weapon systems with the existing laws of international warfare. On the other hand, many
government agencies are in favor of the development of these weapons because of their potential
to decrease the number of non-combatant casualties.
Predicting the short-term and long-term consequences of the development of these
weapons can prove to be difficult, and thus developing policies is an even more complex
process. The issue is replete with nuance, and there does not appear to be a unifying solution.
Questions for the United States remain: Should the nation continue to support the status quo of
the national policy? Or is it necessary to propose changes that may be increasingly aligned with
the current pace of technological advancements? And should the United States be more involved
with the United Nations forums to provide further insight on this issue on an international scale?
These questions are ones that need to be addressed through the lens of ethical, technological, and
political perspectives to reach a solution that will satisfactorily promote an improved future of
warfare.
Section III: Risks/Benefits and Ethical Considerations for Society Summary
The benefits and drawbacks of the development of this technology go hand in hand. As































technology are significant (Turnbull 2018). So questions that naturally arise include: what makes
developing this technology worth the cost? Why should we build weapons of this nature?
The answer to this truly lies at the intersection of society, technology, and security. In
terms of society, there is an ethical role in this issue that cannot be overlooked. There is a moral
case for creating such complex and advanced weaponry, and a significant part of the reason such
technology is being developed is to, in a paradoxical sense, make war more humane. If a weapon
is made increasingly precise, it becomes more possible and more likely to be able to single out
combative enemies in war. Thus, civilian casualties may be minimized, and the protection of
innocent lives may be upheld (Kirkpatrick 2003). For advocates of deployment of AWS, these
systems will provide indisputable advantages when it comes to combat. “Comparatively cheap
and able to operate 24 hours a day without tiring, the robotic warriors could help reduce U.S.
casualties” (Patrick 2019).
An example of reducing civilian casualties has been observed in the use of drone attacks
that have been carried out to target militants in the Middle East. Often, these militants will live
amongst innocent civilians, to deter enemies from attacking. But drone technology allows for
pinpointed attacks that minimize unnecessary damage. Western principles outline moral
standards of protecting life and minimizing violence, so the safety of civilians even in enemy
territories is certainly a worthwhile goal. But will the assurance of fewer civilian deaths
embolden leaders to use such technology more frequently? That is a question that the next few
decades will come to tell. At the end of the day, militants are killing innocent people, and if
precision technology can be used to stop them while minimizing their own damage on innocent































As a society, we must also consider the alignment of this technology with existing policy
surrounding war and military efforts. The Law of Armed Conflict regulates that armed action in
war must fulfill criteria of military necessity, discinction, humanity, and proportionality. By
these standards, the adoption of smart weapons will help to prevent war crimes, because they are
powerful enough to end conflict, fulfill the criteria of necessity, and fulfill distinction by
separating targets as militant and civilian. They also minimize destruction of property and overall
suffering, making them more humane than other weapons, and can be scaled and controlled in
terms of force and damage, which makes them proportional means to achieve goals of war. Since
all of these principles are being upheld, there is a strong case for society to develop smart
weapons for the future (Ceren 2017).
On the other hand, there are valid arguments advocating for the limitation of developing
such technology as well. Concerns include general data privacy policies related to AI
advancements, apprehension about hacked systems, and fears of such weapons falling into
malicious hands. But above all, the ethical controversies regarding autonomous weapon systems
stem primarily from the fact that this is a new level of AI application that has influence over
making life or death decisions. The main purpose of AWS deals with the elimination of a
target--sometimes the target is a building or facility, but sometimes it is a human target. People
are wary about whether these technologies will abide by the International Humanitarian Law set
to “limit the effects of armed conflict”. Rather, there are concerns that autonomous weapon
systems will promote such attacks by inciting the aggravation of human suffering. Another
important factor to consider is that autonomous weapon systems are controlled by a pre-created





























system were to malfunction or make an error. The question of whether the benefits of
autonomous weapon system technologies outweigh the risks are valid, yet difficult to answer. It
may only be a matter of time until all of the powerful militaries in the world possess such
systems, and it is important to consider the issue from diverse angles before making an
all-encompassing policy decision regarding them.
Decisions regarding policy changes will need to take all these risks, benefits, and ethical
ideas about autonomous weapon systems into account. It will need to be a joint effort between
policymakers, government entities, military officials, researchers, engineers, and the influence of
public opinion. There is also a question of whether the arguments for or against this technology
will have a strong enough case to actually influence the pace of development. At the end of the
day, it is most likely that policy changes will need to affect funding for these development
projects in order to have significant influence over their development and rate of proliferation.
Section IV: Financial and Social Costs Associated with this Technology
There are a number of costs that must be accounted for when innovating new technology
in the field of unmanned weapon systems. Not only are financial and economic decisions critical
considerations, but social costs are consequential factors as well.
As the development of this technology proliferates, the global market continues to
expand. By 2025, it is projected that global military spending on artificial intelligence powered
weapons will reach $16 billion, and automated weapons systems will reach $18 billion (Haner






























doing the research and development required to improve this technology, but it is a matter of
time before other nations and even non-nation states are able to make their own advancements in
this field. As time goes on, the cost of developing technology decreases as people discover faster
and more efficient ways to accomplish the same goals, which then enables others to achieve the
same milestones that only wealthier nations previously could. Keeping track and regulating what
international groups are developing or have access to autonomous weapon systems will also
prove to be a challenging endeavour. Terrorist groups such as ISIS and Boko Haram have
already been known to use explosive drones as weapons, and other groups may not be far behind
in integrating autonomous technology as it becomes more commonplace. And because
autonomous weapons allow the perpetrator to be farther away from the target and allows the
target to be more specifically pinpointed, the consequences if this falls into the wrong hands may
be dire. Decreasing costs of development for this technology may make this a closer reality.
The United States has a defense budget that is larger than the combined spending by
militaries in China, South Korea, Russia, and all of the European Union nations combined, and
there has been a sector to focus on autonomy in the United States military for nearly a decade
now. By 2010, there had already been $4 billion invested into autonomy research by the United
States military, and as mentioned before, this number is projected to grow significantly over the
next few years. For reference, China is projected to spend $4.5 billion on drone technology, and
Russia is determined to do the same as well, despite having a lower overall military spending
budget. The European Union intends to invest $8 million in the future for the development of






























The United States has consistently outspent its adversaries in military development, and
is currently at the forefront of artificial intelligence research and development. There have been
more research papers, patents, and top researchers in this field in the United States than
anywhere else. The United States military has plans to produce over 3,400 more unmanned
systems for use in ground, sea, and aerial applications (Haner 2019). It is clear that spending in
this area will continue to increase, and the United States will continue investing in top talent to
make these advancements a reality. It is an expensive undertaking, but one that the military has
determined is a necessary adaptation to keep our national security at the forefront of the world.
Social consequences of these decisions become extremely pertinent when one considers
the rate at which this technology is rapidly advancing. There has not been sufficient discourse
about this among the public about how we as a society think is the best way to handle the issue.
Accountability and oversight will become crucial factors, because as much as this technology
might be used to make us safer, there is always a chance that it can be used against us--and
against humanity--as well. There may be threats to democratic values as terrorist strategies will
change and governments with authoritarian leaders may misuse such technology. The technology
itself is also not infallible. It may not function as expected, or be prone to new threats such as
hacking and biased decision-making. This technology has the potential to change the entire
landscape of warfare so rapidly that all these factors need to be properly considered as potential
costs to society.
A common argument for the development of autonomous weapon systems is that it





























Although there may be merit to this argument, there is a flip side to consider. Will people release
their own moral bent on war by justifying that it is not as bad as it once was? The idea of war
becoming an apathetic concept is not too far removed. Historically, it has been shown that when
military drafts are replaced with all volunteer forces, the opposition to war decreases (Haner
2019). Socially, when people feel a distance between themselves and violence in some way, they
are less likely to care about the violence or actively do anything to prevent it. In the distant
future, some speculate that war will be replaced entirely by autonomous weapons and “killer
robots”. When human beings are increasingly removed from the equation, and we do not need
people to serve as soldiers to the extent that we do now, will people care less? Such costs to our
societal fabric cannot necessarily be quantified, but they are crucial elements as we move to
make policy decisions regarding the development of technology.
Section V : Alternative Paths to Current Policy
With the above information in mind, there are some recommendations our team will
propose regarding the development and use of autonomous weapons, along with an overview of
the implications regarding the adoption of this policy proposal. There are several alternatives to
current policy that may be considered. Each has proponents for and against them, and each has
merits and demerits that must be carefully considered.
For example, the policy that many human rights activists and international non-profit
communities are in favor of is the complete ban of autonomous weapon systems. In the United





























make final lethal decisions by autonomous weapons. However, some countries such as Russia
are actively developing weapons that will not have human controls, and will be fully autonomous
(Livermore 2020). National level policies are not sufficient to level the playing field
internationally, so many people urge action to halt the production of these weapons across
international borders. Such a measure would instate an international ban to prevent nation-states
from developing these weapons altogether, with the weapons being deemed as too dangerous or
inhumane to continue advancing. Another option is to allow the development of this technology
to continue, but alter the regulation procedures associated with them. Such a policy would need
to consider the current regulation in the military regarding research and development of
autonomous weapon systems, evaluate where the system may be flawed, and identify a robust
solution to address these flaws. The last alternative is to allow the development of this
technology to continue uninhibited, and allow even more funding to be allocated to make further
advancements. Such a policy would involve relaxing some of the more stringent policies in place
now and analyzing the financial implications that would be involved with reallocating military
funding to provide more support in this particular area.
Whichever of the three policies is chosen will need to be critically evaluated for efficacy,
costs, and benefits to society. It is important to consider these policy alternatives in the context of
current and future potential technological progress and development, and it is important to
consider them in the context of current policy measures in place. Additionally, it is crucial to





























order to make the best-informed and most well-intentioned decision regarding policy
implementation.
Having considered these various options, our team recommends an alteration to current
policy such that there be an overarching ban on the use of fully autonomous weapons. This is a
stance supported by many arms control activists, human rights groups, and some researchers
themselves. The rules for engaging in warfare with regard to this class of weapons should be
limited by an international agreement that would draw a line prohibiting the deployment of a
lethal weapon that can make life and death decisions with no human discretion.
Of course, there are inherent challenges to adopting a global treaty of this nature. The
prospect of an artificial intelligence powered arms race is not one that is unlikely, and individual
nations will not decrease development of technology if it means that their citizens will face
global threats. And although the ethical considerations are important, appealing solely to moral
ideals is also not necessarily the most pragmatic approach when considering interplay between
various nations, as these perspectives may vary from one place to another. A treaty must offer
some form of protection and benefit to all parties involved, and also indicate some form of
consequence if the rules are violated. In general, this type of a global ban or treaty should be
evaluated from a technological, policy-centered, and ethical perspective to determine its efficacy.
From a technological perspective, although there have been rapid advancements in
developing the technology behind unmanned autonomous weapons and other applications of






























mind and those of a computer when it comes to processing visual data in real time. And the
consequences of a false positive or false negative decision by a machine will have fatal and
irreversible consequences that are simply not worth the potential benefits of more efficient
warfare. Protecting innocent life is an element of war that most people would agree to uphold,
and when it happens now in war it is considered an unavoidable tragedy. But with the
implementation of this class of weapons, this becomes a transgression that could have been
avoided, one that no one can take responsibility for or be held accountable. The very notion of
justice becomes obfuscated in this context. If the technology cannot be trusted to make moral
decisions in the same way a person is able to, then such technology should not be used in any
scenario that would endanger human life.
From a policy-centered perspective, many argue that a global treaty is a futile effort, and
that nations will continue to develop this technology regardless of what action is taken. However,
there are already 25 countries that are calling for a complete ban on the development of these
weapons altogether, which indicates that there might be some promise in this effort in the future
(Satariano 2018). Although the United States is not currently among these countries, there is
always a chance that there will be change down the line. In such a case, the United States would
enter into a global treaty agreeing to halt production and use of unmanned autonomous weapons.
The effects of this would entail adjustments made to funding allocation in the military by
Congress, along with the development of new military strategies and techniques. If powerful,
influential nations such as the United States were to agree to such a treaty, that would likely






























agreement of practical and ethically inclined guidelines to frame the future of modern warfare. In
the current policy framework, there is already a clause discussed above by the DODD that
requires that all systems, not only lethal autonomous systems, “allow commanders and operators
to exercise appropriate levels of judgement over the use of force”. If such a clause were to be
adopted by the international community, it would effectively ban the use of any weapon that
makes decisions without human input at the time of deploying force.
Lastly, from an ethical perspective, there are over 100 nongovernmental groups that have
been calling for a ban on the development of unmanned autonomous weapons (Sayler 2019). The
argument is that a machine has no capacity for moral judgement or mercy, which are key factors
in human decision-making. When decisions are not black and white, the best an algorithm can do
is a probabilistic estimation--leaving plenty of room for bias and error. A weapon of this nature
cannot be taught to abide by ethical guidelines, follow laws or war, and be conscious of the
complexities of international relations and treaties. It cannot make nuanced alterations to levels
of engagement with an adversary in a context-specific manner. And when it comes to human life,
the stakes are simply too high to hand full control over to a machine and expect there to be
justifiable consequences. Another factor to consider in terms of the ethical considerations of the
policy is the law of war. This law is in continuance to the international humanitarian law which
helps to regulate the conditions of a war. The five pillars which the law of war stands upon are
military necessity, unnecessary suffering, proportionality, distinction (discrimination), and honor
(chivalry). It is often mentioned that bringing AWS into the battlefield is a violation of the law of






























begin to fall. This type of technology does not aim to decrease suffering or death on the
battlefield. Thus, the utilization of these weapons is unjust and breaks the international
humanitarian law. Based on these factors, many would agree that the ethical risks in the
development and use of these weapons significantly outweighs the marginal benefits of
deploying this technology.
The effects of adopting this policy will be felt across numerous sectors. There is potential
that civilian research will be affected, since many universities and companies are working on
artificial intelligence applications that could easily be used in military contexts as well. Putting a
ban on the development of such weapons may prevent funding from reaching institutions that are
developing similar technology for other purposes as well. Additionally, defense contractors
anticipate that military spending on this variety of weaponry will exceed $120 billion over the
next 10 years, so there would be an economic impact that would be perceived internally as well
with the adoption of this policy (Satariano 2018). However, as outlined above, ultimately this
policy is the best way to ensure safety and the implementation of ethically guided decisions
when it comes to life or death scenarios that are faced in warfare. The price that would be paid
for the inevitable mistakes of these weapons are far greater than the capitalistic impact of abating
their technological development.
If this policy is not implemented and enacted, the consequences will be dire. The United
States currently is unwilling to limit the development of this technology, and there have been
many unsuccessful diplomatic attempts in trying to reach an international agreement regarding






























voluntary, and there is also controversy about how the policy would be enforced (Satariano
2018). In any case, if this policy remains unadopted, then the development of this technology is
bound to continue. It is a matter of time before nations are in an arms race to build the most
highly effective unmanned autonomous weapons, and in doing so, tensions between nations will
continue to escalate until an inevitable conflict occurs (Haner 2019). By the time there is such a
conflict, there will be no room left to make diplomatic discussions about the ethical use of
weaponry and force. Once one side decides to take a particular set of actions, the other side will
have no choice but to respond in kind, and by then it will be too late to prevent the repercussions
(Satariano 2018). To take heed and be wary of these consequences, it is in the best interests of
the international community to come to an agreement about enacting a ban on the development
of these weapons in the first place.
In conclusion, it is in the nation’s best interest to enter into an international agreement
limiting the development and use of unmanned autonomous weapons, because it is the best
suited solution from the various perspectives considered. Such a policy is beneficial in regards to
technological development because it ensures that the limitations of current technology will not
endanger human life and leave no one to be held responsible for faulty decisions. The adoption is
also feasible within the bounds of existing policy, and improves upon measures currently
implemented by the DODD, which maintains that a human being should be the one to determine
what kind and how much force should be used in an engagement with an adversary. And from an
ethical perspective, this policy will ultimately result in a more humane international society in


















the implementation of this policy regarding autonomous weapons systems and hopes that its
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